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Abstract 
Sound debt management practices help protect government expenditures on debt 
servicing from aggregate shocks and prevent the occurrence of debt crises. Building on 
Giavazzi and Missale (2004), this article examines the optimal allocation of government 
debt for the Czech Republic. To calibrate conditional expectations of macro variables and 
to identify unexpected shocks, a vector autoregression (VAR) model for the Czech 
macroeconomy is estimated. The estimated optimal allocations across short-term debt, 
inflation-linked debt, long-term debt, and foreign currency debt are then discussed in 
relation to the actual allocations implemented by the government debt managers in the 
Czech Republic. We find that the manager of Czech government’s debt allocates too 
much debt into short-term bills and too little debt into inflation-linked bonds based on the 
estimated optimal allocations. Deepening the market for inflation-linked bonds and 
improving government cash management are the core policy recommendations.     
Key words: Public debt management; Optimal debt allocation; VAR model; Czech 
Republic, Emerging Market Economies. 
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1. Introduction 
A government’s debt portfolio contains complex financial structures and can create 
substantial balance sheet risk for the government or cash flow risk for the state budget. Sound debt 
management practices can help prevent the occurrence of debt crises, reduce vulnerability of 
government finances to macroeconomic and financial shocks, and support economic growth. The IMF 
and the World Bank therefore published, in cooperation with national debt management experts, a set 
of guidelines on public debt management for policy makers (IMF and WB, 2001). This work includes 
formulation and properties of public debt management objectives, the underlying institutional 
framework and possible coordination challenges, formulation of the debt management strategy, 
attributes of a sound risk management framework, and other important areas of public debt 
management.  
Much has been written about public debt management and the strategies for optimal debt 
allocation (Sargent and Wallace 1981; Bohn 1990, 1998; Missale 1997; and Missale and Blanchard 
1991, among others). Also, the recent financial and public debt crises have demonstrated the important 
role of public debt management strategy and debt allocation for economic growth. From a practical 
standpoint, Melecky (2012a) reviews debt management strategies around the world and studies 
possible drivers behind the varying formulations of public debt management strategies. Hawkesby and 
Wright (1997) adapt a tax-smoothing methodology used in Bohn (1990) and impose realistic 
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constrains to public debt management to conduct debt allocation analysis for nine OECD countries. 
Buera and Nicolini (2002) find that the size of financial transactions that the government must 
undertake each period to replicate state contingent bonds is very large and increases dramatically with 
the number of states. Gerard and Gilson (2001) show, in a simple two country model, how an 
exchange rate regime can influence the public debt structure. Because the exchange rate risk is 
historically the most important risk for debt managers in emerging market economies, Melecky 
(2012b) provides a review of policy approaches to choosing the currency structure of foreign-currency 
debt. In addition, Melecky (2010) develops a practical approach that debt managers can use when 
deciding on the currency allocation of public external debt across multiple foreign currencies based on 
synchronization indicators of exchange rate volatility.  
This paper focuses on public debt management in the Czech Republic, because its 
experience, of progressing from a transition economy to an emerging market and a high-income 
economy could be informative for debt managers and policy makers in developing and emerging 
market economies. Although numerous studies have focused on fiscal discipline and debt 
sustainability issues (Bulir 2004; Melecky A. and Melecky M. 2012, EC 2012; IMF 2013; Dybczak 
and Melecky 2014), only Matalík and Slavík (2005) to our knowledge focused explicitly on applied 
government debt management in the Czech Republic. They argue that government debt management 
in the Czech Republic went through dynamic development during the transition period of the 1990s 
and early 2000s. A very low initial level of government debt, missing fundamental segments of the 
financial market, and the absence of basic debt instruments, combined with small or non-existent fiscal 
deficits, impeded development of the domestic debt market in the Czech Republic. The need to 
establish a functioning government bond market to spur domestic capital market development and 
manage risk from foreign currency exposures, thus arose. Matalík and Slavík (2005) recommend that 
public debt management be included as part of the state treasury management functions. This 
recommendation contradicts that of Wheeler (2004) who argues for some independence of the debt 
management function. 
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This paper focuses specifically on the allocation strategy for government debt in the Czech 
Republic. It builds on the theoretical approach of Giavazzi and Missale (2004) to empirically analyze 
the optimal government debt allocation for the Czech Republic. The identification of unexpected 
shocks in this approach draws on conditional expectations from an estimated VAR model for the 
Czech macroeconomy. Moreover, the paper discusses the estimated optimal allocation shares in 
relation to the actual ones implemented by the government debt managers in the Czech Republic. It 
also studies the robustness of the determined optimal debt allocation using a sensitivity analysis. 
Based on the conducted analysis the paper aims to propose implementable policy recommendations to 
improve the debt management strategy of the Czech Ministry of Finance (CMoF), respectively its debt 
management unit. 
We find that the debt manager of Czech government’s debt should optimally allocate about 
7% of the debt into short-term CZK bills, about 16% of the debt into foreign currency bonds, 25% into 
CZK inflation-linked bonds, and 52% of the debt into long-term CZK bonds. The actual debt 
allocations implemented by the CMoF in end-2012 differ from the estimated optimal ones, particularly 
for the shares allocated to short-term bills and inflation-linked bonds. In particular, the CMoF allocates 
about 23% into short term bills compared with the suggested optimal allocation of 7% based on our 
estimates. The actual allocation could be viewed as more speculative and opportunistic to generate 
savings. However in practice, greater allocations to short-term bills could reflect other constraints such 
as inefficiencies in cash management or implementation of budgetary plans that the government will 
have to tackle first before it can move toward the optimum allocation. Moreover, because of 
underdeveloped inflation linked bond markets, the CMoF does not allocate any significant share of its 
debt into this instrument.
1
 Our estimated optimal allocations for the Czech government’s debt suggest 
that the Czech government should deepen the market for inflation linked bonds. In addition to 
protecting the government debt portfolio against macroeconomic shocks, efforts to develop the market 
                                                        
1
 In June 2012, the CMoF issued for the first time CPI inflation linked bonds for retail investors and continued to 
issue this type of securities since then. To date, the overall allocation of debt to this instrument remains 
negligible at 0.12% of the total government debt. See also: http://www.sporicidluhopisycr.cz/cs/o-
dluhopisech/typy-dluhopisu/jarni-emise-12-6-2014-628.   
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for inflation indexed bonds could have additional positive effects on the development of the 
institutional investor base and enhance savings mobilization in the Czech Republic.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides stylized facts about 
the development of government debt, its allocation, and servicing. Section 3 outlines theoretical 
underpinnings of the applied approach. Section 4 describes the employed data. Section 5 discusses the 
calibration of individual parameters of the model to determine optimal allocation of the Czech 
government debt. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 conducts a sensitivity analysis. 
Section 8 concludes.   
 
2. Stylized Facts: Management of Government Debt in the Czech Republic  
After the Czech Republic’s split from Slovakia in 1993, the debt of the Czech government 
grew substantially and increased 10.5 times by 2012. Strong growth of the Czech government debt 
occurred also in relation to GDP, albeit with a bit more volatility. The government debt relative to 
GDP increased from 15.6 to 45.7 percent, i.e. roughly tripled between 1993 and 2012 (Figure 1; panel 
1,1).  
Government debt managers in the Czech Republic were thus busy trying to raise the needed 
amount of funds while minimizing the cost and risk associated with the chosen funding strategy. Total 
debt servicing costs increased almost four times with the increasing level of the debt. Nevertheless, the 
government debt managers succeeded in steadily decreasing the debt servicing costs per Czech koruna 
of government debt from 9.5% to 3.4% over the 1993-2012 period. Note that this declining trend has 
been subject to noticeable volatility around the 1997 banking crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Figure 1; panel 1,2).   
More explicitly, the volatility of debt servicing costs (3-year and 5-year rolling standard 
deviation; Figure 1; panel 2,1) decreased from 1997 to 2003 and then increased again, with the 5-year 
rolling measure of volatility reaching its peak in 2012. This development in the volatility of debt 
servicing costs raises a question whether the savings on debt servicing charges observed in panel 1,2 
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were indeed achieved at the same level of risk or government debt managers in the Czech Republic 
became much more opportunistic in their debt allocation and increased their risk taking. Although 
global and domestic factors may have played an important role, the allocation of government debt into 
more risky instruments may have been partly responsible as well.  
The allocation of Czech government debt across short-term CZK debt, long-term CZK debt, 
and long-term foreign currency debt changed substantially over 1993-2012 (Figure 1, panel 2,2). 
Around 1993, the debt managers relied on the combination of short-term CZK paper and long-term 
foreign currency paper because of underdeveloped domestic markets for government debt. This 
combination exposed them to foreign currency and liquidity risks that realized mostly after the 1997 
financial crisis when debt servicing costs spiked (Figure 1; panel 1,2 and panel 2,1). Aware of these 
risks, debt managers of Czech government debt focused on the development of domestic government 
bond market and allocating more debt into medium and long-term government bonds as of 2000. This 
reallocation was done at the expense of allocations to short-term bills and foreign currency 
instruments, and helped protect debt servicing costs from shocks and decrease their volatility. 
However, since 2006, this trend and prudent allocation has been reversed and replaced by greater and 
more opportunistic allocation to short-term bills followed by a slowdown and a slight reversal in the 
decreasing allocation to foreign currency debt. The latter might have been done for strategic reasons to 
preserve the presence and access to international financial markets.    
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
3. Theoretical Underpinnings  
As in Giavazzi and Missale (2004), we consider the situation in which a government 
implements a budget consolidation plan. Further, the responsibility for financing public debt through 
various debt instruments is assigned to a public debt manager. His objective is to minimize the 
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probability of unsuccessful debt consolidation owing to unexpected increase in debt service charges 
and debt revaluation through prudent and inexpensive debt financing.  
The public debt manager faces a policy tradeoff, however. Less risky debt with low volatility 
of debt servicing charges is more expensive, and less expensive debt is more risky and has more 
volatile debt servicing charges. In our model, the debt manager can use four possible bonds to finance 
government debt: the short-term interest rate bond, inflation-indexed bond, foreign currency bond, and 
fixed interest rate bond. In view of its policy tradeoff, the debt manager selects the proportion of 
government debt that will be raised through short-term local-currency debt, through foreign-currency 
debt, through price-indexed debt, and through long-term local-currency debt.   
Government debt grows with increasing servicing costs of short-term public debt in local 
currency, public debt in foreign currency, public debt indexed to prices, long-term public debt, and a 
primary fiscal deficit. Government debt also grows with its positive revaluation due to changes in 
exchange rates, prices, and economic performance.   
The constrained optimization problem of the debt manager outlined above is formally 
described in Appendix 1. Solving this optimization problem under the employed assumptions gives the 
following results for the optimal shares of short-term debt, 
*s , of foreign currency debt, 
*q , and of 
price-indexed debt, 
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2 Note that because risk and expected costs of debt service both influence the probability of debt stabilization, the objective of 
debt stabilization offers a solution independent of the government’s risk preferences, as Giavazzi and Missale (2004) argue. 
 
- 7 - 
 
 
   
y t* 1 1
1
1 11 1* * 1 1
1 1 1
( B ) ( )
( )
( ) 2Pr
( ) ( ) ( )1 2Pr
tt t
t t t
T
t t tt t t t
t
t t t t
BCov y
h
B Var B
E A BCov e Cov i
q s IP
Var Var BVar

 

 
  
 

    
  
 
 

  

  (3) 
Note that the optimal share of long term debt is given by  * * *1 s q h   . In (1)-(3), y and   
are elasticities of government budget to GDP with respect to output growth and inflation respectively. 
Bt denotes the percentage value of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Pr denotes probability that the 
adopted stabilization plan fails, and Et (At –ΔBt
T
) is the planned reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
over period T.  TPt, FPt and IPt represent the term risk premium, the foreign exchange risk premium 
on the local relative to the foreign currency, and the inflation risk premium respectively. Cov(.) stands 
for covariance and Var(.) for variance of corresponding variables conditional on information available 
at time t. 
More specifically, the conditional covariance of two random variables 1tU   and 1tV   can be 
computed as: 
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where 
* * *y , , i ,e , y , , it t t t t t t t 
     and * denotes foreign economy variables. The conditional 
variance of two random variables 1tU   and 1tV  can then be computed analogously. 
We use a vector autoregression model of order p (VAR(p) model) to estimate the conditional 
covariances and variances: 
1 1t t tW B DZ          (19) 
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where  1 y , , i ,et t t t tW   , B is a matrix of coefficients, and tZ is a vector of forecast errors which 
are serially uncorrelated and have zero mean and unit variance. Note that  1 |t t tB E W    . D  
then contains estimates of the conditional covariances and variances of unexpected shocks:  
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The next section links the discussed model variables to observables—that is the data on the 
functioning of the macroeconomy of a given country, the Czech Republic in this case. 
 
 
4. Data Description 
Our study focuses on the Czech Republic and works with the data from the Czech economy. 
The foreign economy (rest-of-the world) variables are approximated by data from the Euro Area. To 
calibrate the model, including computation of the conditional covariances and variances, we use data 
on real GDP for the Czech Republic from the Czech Statistical Office, whereas nominal GDP for the 
Euro Area from the Eurostat, harmonized CPI, the nominal CZK/EUR exchange rate, the 3-month 
money market rates for the Czech Republic and the Euro Area are from the Eurostat. These data series 
are quarterly and span from the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 2013. For the calibration 
of model parameters, we use the general government debt to GDP ratio in the second quarter of 2013 
from the Eurostat. Further, to calibrate difference in the yields for Czech government bonds issued in 
domestic and foreign currency, we use the yields on 10 year government bonds in CZK and EUR in 
2012 from the Czech National Bank’s ARAD system and Bloomberg respectively. Government 
revenues and expenditures were obtained from the Czech Statistical office and span from the first 
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quarter of 1999 to the second quarter of 2013, because earlier data on the two variables are not 
publicly available. All data are described in detail in Table A1 of Appendix 2. 
Table A2 of Appendix 2 reports data summary statistics on all variables employed in the 
calibration of the model starting at the earliest available observation and ending in the second quarter 
of 2013. 
5. Calibration of Parameters of Conditional Covariances and Variances 
This section explains in detail how individual parameters entering the computation of the 
optimal shares of different bonds in the government debt portfolio in equations (1)-(3) are calibrated. 
Recall that the assumed options for the debt manager are to raise government debt using short-term 
bonds, foreign currency bonds, price-index bonds and long-term bonds. 
  
5.1. Calibrating parameters 
The semi-elasticities of the government budget to GDP ratio to output growth, 
y
 , and to 
inflation, 

 , were estimated as the respective correlations over 1999Q1-2013Q2. In particular, we 
calculated ηy as the correlation between quarterly real GDP growth and the government budget to 
nominal GDP ratio, and ηπ as the correlation between the quarterly inflation rate and the government 
budget to nominal GDP ratio. Note that 
y
 equals 0.15 (Table 1), suggesting that the ratio of 
government budget to GDP improves when the economy is growing in real terms. The elasticity of the 
government budget to GDP ratio to CPI inflation, 

 , is estimated at 0.2. Interestingly, both calibrated 
parameters happen to be similar to the calibrations used by Giavazzi and Missale for Brazil. The 
government debt to GDP ratio, Bt, was set to 46.5 percent in line with the Czech government’s 
indebtedness in 2013Q2.  
[Table 1 Here] 
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The term premium, TPt, is calculated as the last year (2012Q2-2013Q2) average of the 
difference between the yield of 10-year government bonds and the yield of 3-month money market 
rate (assumed to track the 3-month Treasury bill rate). The foreign exchange premium on the Czech 
koruna vis-à-vis the euro, FPt , is computed as the last year is average of the difference between the 
yields on 10 year government bonds issued in CZK and EUR in domestic and euro markets 
respectively, less the expected percentage change in the CZK/EUR nominal exchange rate. The latter 
was set to zero in line with the random walk hypothesis for the exchange rates.
3
 The inflation 
premium, IPt, is calculated as the last year‘s average of the difference between actual CPI inflation at 
time t and the expected CPI inflation conditional on an information set dated t-1. The AR(1) process 
was used to generate expected inflation for simplicity. This approach was used because data on 
inflation expectations are not readily available and inflation linked bonds are not commonly traded.
4
 
We analyze the sensitivity of our results to each of these parameters later in the paper.          
The probability that a given stabilization (fiscal consolidation) plan may fail is initially set at 2 
percent following Giavazzi and Missale (2004, p. 9). The probability that a fiscal adjustment in the 
Czech Republic will fail could be slightly elevated as broadly illustrated in Appendix 3, Table B1. 
From 2002 to 2013, a period for which numerical targets of fiscal adjustment plans are available, most 
fiscal adjustment plans could be judged successful, although some of them (2006, 2007, 2009) only 
partly. Further research could focus on more careful assessment of the track record of the Czech 
government in adhering to its announced stabilization plans, most notably those involving significant 
fiscal consolidation. The consolidation plan, the planned reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
 
1 1t t t
T
E A B
 
  , is initially set to 1 percent. This calibration is consistent with the Czech 
government’s plan to gradually decrease fiscal deficits and slowdown debt accumulation, and achieve 
                                                        
3 Past year averages at different points in time suggested switching signs (from appreciation to depreciation) for the average 
trend of the exchange rate, concurring with the random walk hypothesis. 
4 Note that another simple approximation of inflation expectations could be achieved by using the Czech National Bank 
(CNB) inflation target at a given time, assuming perfect credibility of CNB’s monetary policy and its inflation target. 
Alternatively, fast learning of economic agents would need to be in place to ensure that this approximation holds during a 
monetary policy-driven disinflationary period, as experienced by the Czech Republic. 
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a balanced budget in 2015. We analyze the sensitivity of our results to the two parameters later in the 
paper.  
 
5.2. Calibration of conditional variances and covariances 
The process of computing conditional covariances and variances consists of the following 
steps. First, we estimate an unrestricted VAR model with four lags (VAR(4)), as suggested by the 
Akaike information criterion (see Table A3 in Appendix 2). This longer lag is also theoretically 
required because of the year on year differences in variables that we use for the estimation and 
forecasts. The year on year differencing introduces up to three quarter autocorrelation by construction. 
The VAR contains, as endogenous variables, domestic output growth, inflation, the interest rate, and 
the percentage change in the CZK/EUR exchange rate. We use year on year changes in the variables to 
ensure that the variables are stationary. In addition, the VAR contains exogenous variables, namely the 
constant, time trend, as well as the foreign (Eurozone) output, inflation, and interest rate.  
The variables yt, it, πt and et are then calculated as the forecast errors of the VAR model’s 
static (one period ahead) forecasts of output growth, inflation, the interest rate, and the change in the 
exchange rate. The estimation results for the VAR(4) model are reported in Table A4 in Appendix 2. 
The plots of residuals from the estimated VAR are also reported in Appendix 2 in Figure A1. The 
residuals are well behaved apart from two large outliers. First, we can observe an outlier for the 
interest rate equation at the beginning of the sample that corresponds to the period before the 1997-
1998 financial crisis. Second, we can observe an outlier for the real GDP corresponding to the onset of 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Shortening the sample or using a dummy variable to take out the 
outliers does not materially change the VAR estimation results.  
We also inspect the actual and predicted values of the VAR variables to make sure the VAR 
performs well for forecasting purposes (Figure A2 in Appendix 2). The estimated VAR performs 
reasonably well in forecasting with the best fits produced for the interest rate and inflation variables 
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(Table A5 in Appendix 2). The relatively worse fit for the exchange rate could be explained by the 
traditionally high volatility of exchange rate series that applies also to the CZK/EUR rate.      
The calibrated conditional covariances and variances based on the estimated VAR are 
reported in Table 2:  
[Table 2 Here] 
The conditional variances correspond to the variances of forecast errors for individual variables from 
the estimated VAR(4). The conditional variance for the exchange rate (the e,e cell) is much larger 
compared with other variables whereas the interest rate variance (the i,i cell) is the smallest. Also the 
estimated conditional covariances reveal interesting observations for government debt managers in the 
Czech Republic that seek to exploit natural hedges for efficient debt portfolio allocation. 
Consider the covariances of GDP growth with other variables first. The covariance of GDP 
growth and inflation is negative and significant suggesting that business cycles could have been driven 
more by supply shocks than demand shocks. This conjecture is consistent with the presence of two 
crisis periods that involved deep recessions, in which production capacity diminished, and strong 
recoveries followed. This negative covariance could imply that nominal revenues for the Czech 
government could be more stable than in other countries in which the business cycle is primarily 
driven by demand shocks. The covariance of GDP growth with the interest rate is positive but 
insignificant, and its small magnitude suggests a weak transmission channel of monetary policy from 
interest rates to GDP growth. The negative sign on the covariance between GDP growth and changes 
in the exchange rate is consistent with the covariance between GDP growth and inflation. If GDP 
growth is primarily driven by supply shocks, positive supply shocks such as productivity increases 
should result in appreciation of CZK vis-à-vis EUR as suggested by the estimated covariance. 
Consider the additional covariances of inflation with the remaining variables. The 
covariance of inflation with the interest rate is positive and significant in line with the expectation that 
monetary policy rates increase when inflation increases. The covariance of inflation with changes in 
the exchange rate is estimated negative but insignificant. Although the purchasing power parity 
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hypothesis suggests that (other things equal) increasing inflation should result in depreciation of local 
currency and an increase in the exchange rate, the estimated negative covariance implies different 
transmission mechanism. We conjecture that as inflation increases and interest rates rise, capital 
inflows due to the increased interest rate differential could cause the exchange rate to appreciate, at 
least in the short term.  
Consider the remaining covariance of the interest rate and changes in the exchange rate. The 
estimated negative covariance is only marginally significant. The estimate contradicts the hypothesis 
of uncovered interest parity. The estimate implies that an increasing interest rate differential on CZK 
vis-à-vis EUR shall result in future appreciation of the koruna within the one year horizon presumably 
because of higher capital inflows. This is however in line with empirical research suggesting that 
uncovered interest parity has a mixed performance and tends to only hold in the medium term (the 2-5 
years horizon) (Chinn and Quayyum, 2012). 
We further compare our calibration of the ratio of the covariances and variances entering 
equations (1)-(3) with those used by Giavazzi and Missale (Table A6 in Appendix 2). Overall, our 
calibrations differ from those of Giavazzi and Missale. Although the relative magnitudes of our 
calibration are in some cases similar (Cov(eπ)/Var(e), Cov(ie)/Var(i), Cov(ie)/Var(e)) to those of Giavazzi 
and Missale, in other cases, they are in absolute values nine times larger (Cov(yπ)/Var(π)) or ten times 
smaller (Cov(eπ)/Var(π)) or bear a different sign altogether (Cov(yi)/Var(i); Cov(ye)/Var(e)). 
 
6. Discussion of Results 
Using the baseline calibration of the parameters presented in Tables 1 and 2, and equations 
(1)-(3), Matlab’s fsolve function’s solution produces optimal shares for government debt allocation 
that are presented in Table 3.  
[Table 3 Here] 
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The estimated results suggest that the manager of Czech government’s debt should allocate 
7.28% of the debt into short-term CZK bills (T-bills), 15.98% of the debt into foreign currency bonds, 
25.16% into CZK inflation-linked bonds, and 51.58% of the debt into long-term fix-rate CZK bonds. 
Managing liquidity risks, repayments of longer term bonds, and cash requirements for treasury 
operations forces the debt manager to allocate at least a small share of government debt into short-term 
bills. We estimate this allocation to be about 7%. We will discuss this number in more detail shortly 
when comparing our optimal estimates with the actual allocations implemented by Czech debt 
managers. 
The allocation of about 16% to foreign currency bonds could be possibly higher given the 
negative foreign currency premium and the implied potential savings. The potential cost savings from 
a greater allocation of debt into foreign currency are, however, mitigated by the relatively high 
conditional variance of the CZK/EUR exchange rate (the size of unexpected change in the exchange 
rate), and the significantly negative conditional covariance of the exchange rate with GDP growth. The 
former increases overall risk of allocating debt into foreign currency while having revenues in local 
currency. The latter suggests that when government revenues decline the CZK tends to depreciate, 
thus increasing debt service charges and increasing the CZK equivalent of the EUR denominated debt.     
Despite the negative inflation premium (Table 1, IP), the allocation to inflation-linked bonds is 
substantial of about 25% of total debt. This result arises mostly because the conditional variance of 
unexpected changes in inflation is high and dominates the influence of the negative inflation premium. 
Note that the negative inflation premium alone would suggest allocation of Czech government’s 
savings (reserves) in CZK inflation-linked paper. In practice, such allocation could be implemented by 
the Czech government holding savings (reserves) in inflation-linked paper issued by the Czech 
National Bank (CNB). Apart from benefiting from the negative inflation risk premium—that is, actual 
inflation lower than the expected one priced in by the market—the inflation-linked paper issued by the 
CNB would also hold the bank accountable for systematically undershooting its inflation target and 
discipline it further to adhering to it. 
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In theory, an increasing probability that the government will fail to fully implement its debt 
consolidation program increases the desired allocations to long-term debt. Because an increase in the 
probability of future failure of the consolidation program will result in increasing financing costs for 
the government, locking into a lower fixed rate enables debt managers to protect the government 
budget from unexpected increases in future debt service charges. For the Czech government, the 
probability of failure to implement its consolidation program could be slightly elevated (Appendix 3). 
This shows up in the estimated optimal allocation of about 52% in medium to long-term CZK debt. 
Table 3 also shows the latest available data from 2012 on the actual allocation of Czech 
government debt across the considered options. The actual allocations are in some cases noticeably 
different from the estimated optimal ones. As discussed, one factor that could explain the mismatch 
between the actual and the optimal debt allocations is the underdeveloped market for inflation-linked 
bonds. But other factors could also play a role. Debt managers in the Czech Republic could be rather 
opportunistic in debt allocation overweighting perceived savings from larger allocation into short-term 
debt over the refinancing risk that derives from such allocation. However, one consideration that we 
have ignored, and that could justify larger allocations to short-term bills, are possibly larger cash 
management needs of the Czech government throughout the fiscal year to smooth the differences 
between the collation of government revenues and execution of government expenditures. Such needs 
could arise, for example, because of expected seasonality in government revenues that mismatch the 
government expenditure plans or from an overall inefficient implementation of government budget 
plans.  
Finally, the near zero actual allocation of government debt to CZK denominated inflation-
linked instruments is due to the fact that these instruments are not commonly issued by MoF, or 
otherwise commonly traded in the market. However, the estimated optimal allocation for Czech 
government debt implies the Czech government should further develop the market for inflation index 
bond to better protect its debt portfolio and the government budget from unexpected changes in debt 
servicing costs; notwithstanding the additional positive effects this development could have on the 
institutional investor base and savings mobilization.   
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7. Sensitivity Analysis 
As in any calibration or estimation approach, there is some uncertainty around the calibrated 
parameters. This uncertainty could be even more important for results obtained from a non-linear 
model like ours. For that reason, we conduct a sensitivity analysis regarding the calibrated parameters. 
Such analysis shall also test the robustness of our results and gain further insights into the applicability 
of the results in various circumstances that the debt manager can be faced with in the future. More 
specifically, we vary the model parameters within a plausible range around their calibrated values, and 
examine how the estimated optimal shares of foreign currency, short-term local currency, inflation-
indexed, and long-term local currency debt change in response. The results of such sensitivity analysis 
are plotted in Figure A3 in Appendix 2. 
Overall, our results are rather insensitive to changes in single parameters, except for the 
foreign currency and inflation risk premiums (FP, IP), and the extent of the consolidation plan (the 
size of budget adjustment). An increasing foreign exchange premium implies progressively greater 
optimal allocations to foreign currency bonds and inflation-indexed bonds and smaller allocations into 
long-term bonds. The sensitivity results suggest that if uncertain about the FP value, debt managers 
should gravitate to more conservative allocations into local currency. The baseline results are also 
sensitive to changes in the IP. Negative IP suggests that future actual inflation will be on average 
greater than expected, and encourages allocation of government savings (reserves) in inflation-linked 
papers. In contrast, positive IP encourages some borrowing in CZK denominated, inflation-linked 
bonds.  
The optimal debt allocation is similarly sensitive to how ambitious the fiscal consolidation 
plan is. A more ambitious consolidation plan implies greater allocations towards long-term fixed rate 
debt. This result could seem counter-intuitive if debt management is part of the fiscal savings efforts 
and is forced to cut cost at the expense of greater risk taking, because the probability of failure of such 
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plan will likewise increase. However, if debt management is independent and not part of the fiscal 
consolidation plan, as argued by Wheeler (2004), the implications are different. The results suggest 
that in a risk neutral environment government consolidation may require stable debt service charges 
that do not introduce an unexpected cost to the budget.
5
 A greater allocation to fixed rate bonds is then 
justified.     
 
8.  Conclusion 
Sound debt management practices can help avoid unexpected increases in debt services 
charges, reduce debt vulnerability to macroeconomic and financial shocks, and thus prevent the 
occurrence of debt crises. This paper carried out an empirical analysis of the optimal debt allocation 
for the Czech Republic using the approach of Giavazzi and Missale (2004) and an estimated VAR 
model for the Czech macroeconomy.  
The estimation results suggest that the Czech government should allocate most of its debt 
(about 52%) to long-term fixed-rate bonds. This is a smaller share than the Czech Ministry of Finance 
(CMoF) allocated to this instrument by end-2012 (65.9%). Further, the CMoF should allocate about 
25% of its debt to inflation-linked bonds. Currently, such instrument is not widely used by debt 
managers in the Czech Republic and the corresponding market is underdeveloped. The results 
substantiate considerable efforts that the debt managers in the Czech Republic should devote to 
developing the market for inflation-linked bonds. The CMoF can draw on examples of other countries 
that have developed markets for inflation-linked bonds such as France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. 
The CMoF’s allocation into foreign currency bonds of 11% is broadly aligned with the 
suggested optimal allocation of 16%, given the uncertainty about the foreign currency premium. In 
contrast, the CMoF’s allocation to short-term bills of 23% is significantly above the suggested optimal 
                                                        
5
 Strategic interactions between the government and the central bank (the monetary-fiscal mix) as well as long-
term demographic factors may also play a role in determining the feasibility of a planned fiscal consolidation 
(Libich and Stehlik, 2012).    
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allocation of about 7% and could be introducing excessive risks to the debt portfolio under the 
assumed risk neutral preferences. In practice, the CMoF allocation to short-term bills could be driven 
by inefficiencies that are out of the debt manager’s control, and could stem from inefficient cash 
management or implementation of budget plans, including tax collection and government 
expenditures. 
More research is needed to aid formulation of robust government debt management strategies 
in the Czech Republic, and this paper is one of the first attempts in this direction. More broadly, 
further research is warranted on the optimal allocation of debt in emerging market economies that 
typically face a broader set of challenges than advanced economies, including those due to political 
economy factors. 
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Tables in the Main Text 
Table 1: Calibration of input parameters  
Parameter Description 
Baseline 
Calibration 
Giavazzi & 
Missale (2004) 
Calibration 
ηy Elasticity of government budget to GDP with respect to output  0.15 0.2 
ηπ Elasticity of government budget to GDP with respect to inflation 0.20 0.2 
Bt Government debt to GDP (2
nd
 quarter 2013), (in %)  46.5 57.2 
TPt Term premium (last year average), (in %) 1.47 2.5 
FPt Foreign Exchange Premium on CZK (last year average), (in %) -1.19 4.3 
IPt Inflation premium (last year average), (in %) -0.39 1.9 
Pr Probability that stabilization plan fails, (in %) 2 2 
Et(At-delthaBt
T
) Planned reduction in debt-to-GDP ratio over T, (in %) 1 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table 2: Calibration of conditional covariances and variances 
Variance - Covariance matrix 
  y Π i e 
y 
0.367 
-0.089 
(0.040) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.607 
(0.161) 
π  
0.286 
0.053 
(0.015) 
-0.033  
(0.158) 
i   
0.056 
-0.084 
(0.069) 
e    
5.325 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: Standard errors in the parentheses 
 
 
Table 3: Estimated optimal debt allocation and actual allocation of Czech Government Debt 
Debt Allocations s* q* h* Fix 
Estimated Optimal 7.28 15.98 25.16 51.58 
Actual (December 2012) 22.8% 11.3% 0.0% 65.9% 
Source: Authors’ calculations; CMoF Development of the Government debt.6 
Note: s* - short-term floating-rate debt, q* - foreign-currency denominated debt, h* - inflation-indexed debt, and 
fix - long-term fixed-rate debt, which is computed as 1-s*-q*-h* 
 
                                                        
6
 Available at:  
http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/verejny-sektor/hospodareni/rizeni-statniho-dluhu/dluhova-statistika/struktura-a-vyvoj-
statniho-dluhu 
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Figures in the Main Text 
 
   Figure 1: Czech government debt (top panels) and Debt servicing costs (bottom panels) 
 
 
  
Source: CMoF and authors’ calculations 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
The Optimization Problem of the Government Debt Manager 
 
As in Giavazzi and Missale (2004), the debt manager tries to solve the following optimization 
problem: 
A. Objective Function 
 
1 1
t+1 1
, , , ,
Prob X>A
T
t t
T
t t t
s q h s q h
A B
Min E B Min E X dx
 



  
   .    (1) 
By choosing the proportion of public debt to be raised through short-term debt, s, foreign currency 
debt, q, price-indexed debt, h, and long-term debt (1-s-q-h), it minimizes the probability that the 
intended fiscal adjustment will fail due to unexpectedly high debt service charges or debt revaluation. 
tE is expectation conditional on information available at time t. t+1A is the expected adjustment, X 
denotes the uncertain component of the fiscal adjustment, 1tB  is the debt-to-GDP ratio, and 1
T
tB   is the 
trend debt ratio—that is, the debt ratio that would exist in period t + 1 in the absence of the fiscal 
correction.  
B. Constraints 
The debt ratio rises if interest payments increase, primary budget surplus decreases, nominal 
GDP grows, or domestic currency depreciates, which affect the value of foreign currency debt. The 
nominal rate of return on fixed rate bonds is known at the time of issuance and equals to the long-term 
interest rate (Rt): 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T T T
t t t t t t t t t t tB B B I B e qB S y B                .   (2) 
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where 1 1
T T
t t tB B B     is the debt accumulation, 1t tI B  are the nominal interest payments, te  is the log 
of nominal exchange rate, q is the share of euro denominated bonds, 1
T
tS   is the trend primary surplus, 
1ty   is the log of output, and 1t   is the rate of inflation. 
The interest payments are as follows: 
     *1 1 1 1It t t t t t t t t t t tI B i sB R RP qB R hB R s q h B           .  (3) 
where Rt
* 
is the foreign interest rate, Rt
I 
is
 
the real interest rate  known at the time of issuance and πt+1 is 
the rate of inflation in the following period. it+1 is the average interest rate between period t and t+1 
known at time t. The return on euro denominated bonds   * 11t t tR RP e    is approximated by the 
sum of the foreign interest rate and the risk premium (Rt+RPt).  
The ratio of the trend primary surplus to GDP is uncertain, since it depends on cyclical 
developments of GDP and inflation: 
   1 1 1 1 1 1
T T
t t t y t t t t t tS E S y E y E             .    (4) 
where 1
T
tS   is the ratio of trend primary surplus to GDP, y  is the semi-elasticity of government 
budget (relative to GDP) with respect to output,   is the semi elasticity of budget with respect to the 
price level and tE  are the expectations conditional on the information at time t.  
C. First Order Conditions 
The government selects shares of debt instruments with respect to the first order conditions 
(5)-(7). The debt structure is optimal only if increased probability of failure is equalizes across debt 
instruments. 
  1 1 1 0Tt t t t tE A B i R             (5) 
  *1 1 1 0Tt t t t t t t tE A B R RP e e R                (6) 
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 1 1 1 0T It t t t t tE A B R R               (7) 
where 1 1
T
t tA B   is the planned reduction in the debt to GDP ratio and  1 1Tt tA B    is a function of 
s, q and h. 
D. Assumed Behavioral Relationships 
Based on the Giavazzi and Missale’s framework, the following behavioral relationships are 
assumed. The difference between interest costs of short rate bonds and fixed rate bonds is given by the 
deviation of the average short rate from its expected value and the term premium (TPt) on fixed rate 
bonds: 
1 1 1t t t t t ti R i E i TP      .       (8) 
The term premium is calculated from the true term premium ( ItTP ) and informational spread: 
 1 1I It t t t t tTP TP E i E i    ,       (9) 
where ItE  are investor’s expectations. 
The difference between the return on the euro denominated bonds (expressed in Czech 
koruna) and the return on fixed rate bonds is influenced by the deviation of average exchange rate 
from the expected exchange rate and the exchange rate risk premium: 
*
1 1 1t t t t t t t t tR RP e e R e E e FP          .     (10) 
The foreign premium is calculated from the true term premium ( ItFP ) and informational 
spread: 
1 1
I I
t t t t t tFP FP E e E e    ,       (11) 
where ItE  are investor’s expectations. 
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The difference between interest costs of price-indexed bonds and fixed rate bonds is given by 
the deviation of the average inflation rate from the expected inflation rate and the inflation risk 
premium (IPt):   
1 1 1
I
t t t t t t tR R E IP          .      (12) 
The inflation premium is calculated from the true premium ( I
tIP ) and informational spread: 
1 1
I I
t t t t t tIP IP E E     .       (13) 
where ItE  are investor’s expectations. 
E. Triangular Approximation of Distribution 
To estimate the probability distribution function ( )X , Giavazi and Missale take a linear 
approximation of ( )X  across bad realizations of the fiscal adjustment X>0. This approximation 
yields the triangular probability density function described in (14). Greater bad realizations are thus 
less likely to occur than smaller ones 
 
2
X X
X
X


 .         (14) 
F. The Solution 
Using (14), substituting (8)-(13) into (5)-(7), and rearranging gives the following solutions for 
the optimal shares of short-term debt, s*, foreign currency debt, q*, inflation-linked bonds, h*, and 
fixed rate debt (1-s*-q*-h*): 
   
 
   
y t 1 1* 1 1
1 1
1 11 1* * 1 1
1 1 1
( B ) ( )
( )
( ) 2Pr
( ) ( ) ( )1 2Pr
t t tt t
t t t t
T
t t tt t t t
t
t t t t
B Cov iCov y i
s
B Var i B Var i
E A BCov e i Cov i
q h TP
Var i Var i BVar i

  

  
 
    
  
 
 

  

,  (15) 
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   
 
   
y t 1 1* 1 1
1 1
1 11 1* * 1 1
1 1 1
( B ) ( )
( )
( ) 2Pr
( ) ( ) ( )1 2Pr
t t tt t
t t t t
T
t t tt t t t
t
t t t t
B Cov eCov y e
q
B Var e B Var e
E A BCov e i Cov e
s h FP
Var e Var e BVar e

  

  
 
    
  
 
 

  

,  (16) 
 
   
y t* 1 1
1
1 11 1* * 1 1
1 1 1
( B ) ( )
( )
( ) 2Pr
( ) ( ) ( )1 2Pr
tt t
t t t
T
t t tt t t t
t
t t t t
BCov y
h
B Var B
E A BCov e Cov i
q s IP
Var Var BVar

 

 
  
 

    
  
 
 

  

.  (17) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Tables 
 
Table A1: Description of data and data sources 
Variable Characteristic Source 
Nominal GDP – EA 
GDP in current prices, seasonally adjusted and adjusted data 
by working days, millions of euro (from 1.1.1999)/millions 
of ECU (up to 31.12.1998), for CR and EA 
EUROSTAT 
Real GDP - CR GDP in constant prices (2005=100), billions of CZK CNB’s ARAD 
HCPI 
Harmonized consumer price index, 1996=100,  seasonally 
adjusted, index, all-items HICP, for CR and EA 
Calculated as 3-month average from monthly data 
EUROSTAT 
Exchange rate 
Nominal bilateral exchange rate CZK/EUR (ECU), quarterly 
average 
EUROSTAT 
3M Money Market 
interest rate 
3-month Money market interest rate, for CR and EA 
Series are based on national methodologies. EONIA and 
Euribor (see: http://www.euribor.org) follow a European 
methodology. Both use the same panel of banks. 
EUROSTAT 
10Y bond yield 10-year maturity treasury bond yield (Maastricht criterion) CNB’s ARAD 
Government revenues Total general government revenues  CSO 
Government 
expenditures 
Total general government expenditures CSO 
Debt to GDP ratio General government gross debt as % of GDP EUROSTAT 
Note: CR = Czech Republic, EA = Euro Area (EA11-2000, EA12-2006, EA13-2007, EA15-2008, EA16-2010, EA17). CNB = 
the Czech National Bank, CSO = the Czech Statistical Office. Government revenues and expenditures were obtained from: 
http://apl.czso.cz/pll/rocenka/rocenkavyber.gov_p?mylang=CZ. 
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Table A2: Data summary statistics  
Data availability 1996Q1-2013Q2 1999Q1-2013Q2 2000Q3-2013 2000Q1-2013Q2 
Variable 
3M 
interest 
rate CR 
3M 
interest 
rate EA 
nominal 
exchange 
rate 
CZK/EUR HCPI CR HCPI EA 
real GDP 
CR 
nominal 
GDP EA 
government 
expenditures 
CR 
government 
revenues 
CR 
10Y bond 
yield CR 
debt to GDP 
ratio CR 
 Mean 4.88 2.92 30.44 137.73 117.08 755.39 1944056 345621 315333 4.34 30.64 
 Median 2.73 3.10 30.32 136.67 116.25 740.05 1956774 360548 330622 4.15 28.55 
 Maximum 19.69 5.63 37.75 169.20 138.87 914.80 2395462 511701 413931 7.38 47.90 
 Minimum 0.46 0.20 24.09 97.37 99.33 600.20 1395031 191637 184385 1.92 16.00 
 Std. Dev. 4.65 1.50 4.37 18.89 12.00 120.87 333325 72842 66581 1.20 7.89 
 Skewness 1.52 -0.21 0.09 -0.22 0.17 0.01 -0.21 -0.27 -0.36 0.41 0.43 
 Kurtosis 4.28 1.86 1.61 2.28 1.75 1.31 1.62 2.45 1.92 3.25 2.79 
 Jarque-Bera 31.88 4.26 5.71 2.09 4.91 8.35 6.07 1.42 4.09 1.66 1.78 
 Probability 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.35 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.49 0.13 0.44 0.41 
 Sum 341.27 204.29 2130.93 9641.20 8195.63 52877.20 1.36E+08 20046041 18289327 230.28 1654.60 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1489.66 155.64 1315.20 24608.98 9942.30 1008138.00 7.67E+12 3.02E+11 2.53E+11 75.16 3298.33 
 Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 58 58 53 54 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A3: VAR lag length selection 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -495.3471 NA   195.1944  16.62410  17.31027  16.89351 
1 -297.8647  337.6312  0.563596  10.76983   12.00494*  11.25476 
2 -270.0976  43.88997  0.392189  10.39024  12.17429  11.09071 
3 -246.3852   34.42116*   0.315860*  10.14146  12.47444   11.05745* 
4 -229.5004  22.33147  0.323941   10.11292*  12.99484  11.24443 
Source: Author’s calculations 
   
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: 
Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion 
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Table A4: Estimation Results for VAR(4) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: Standard errors in ( ); Sample (adjusted): 1998Q1 2013Q2, 62 observations;  RGDP is real GDP growth, INFL is 
inflation, IR denotes interest rate and ER is Exchange rate growth, foreign variables are denoted as follows RGDP_EA – real 
GDP growth, INFL_EA – inflation, IR_EA – interest rate. 
 
  
 RGDP INFL IR ER 
RGDP(-1)  0.944154  0.097568  0.064715 -0.757007 
  (0.17702)  (0.15617)  (0.06925)  (0.67435) 
RGDP(-2) -0.191271 -0.134499  0.005494  1.834801 
  (0.24330)  (0.21465)  (0.09518)  (0.92684) 
RGDP(-3) -0.143462 -0.061505 -0.245588 -0.637650 
  (0.23513)  (0.20744)  (0.09198)  (0.89572) 
RGDP(-4)  0.305405  0.122711  0.174240 -0.185175 
  (0.15102)  (0.13324)  (0.05908)  (0.57532) 
INFL(-1) -0.161868  0.656698  0.149358 -0.390164 
  (0.18120)  (0.15986)  (0.07089)  (0.69027) 
INFL(-2)  0.133689 -0.106678  0.105574  0.250111 
  (0.20637)  (0.18207)  (0.08073)  (0.78617) 
INFL(-3) -0.487412 -0.053229 -0.116308 -0.340472 
  (0.18457)  (0.16284)  (0.07220)  (0.70311) 
INFL(-4) -0.018741 -0.129823 -0.112779  0.261474 
  (0.16272)  (0.14356)  (0.06366)  (0.61988) 
IR(-1)  0.125314  0.240645  0.843043  0.826618 
  (0.35273)  (0.31119)  (0.13799)  (1.34372) 
IR(-2) -0.004186 -0.106893 -0.270611 -2.136574 
  (0.38644)  (0.34093)  (0.15117)  (1.47211) 
IR(-3) -0.021189  0.357610  0.161256  1.668067 
  (0.19071)  (0.16826)  (0.07461)  (0.72652) 
IR(-4)  0.183973 -0.145287  0.086230 -0.068094 
  (0.14095)  (0.12435)  (0.05514)  (0.53693) 
ER(-1) -0.092875  0.134966  0.043185  0.807108 
  (0.04520)  (0.03988)  (0.01768)  (0.17218) 
ER(-2)  0.057226 -0.047340 -0.005866 -0.267476 
  (0.05137)  (0.04532)  (0.02010)  (0.19570) 
ER(-3) -0.042824  0.019727 -0.041272  0.066444 
  (0.05259)  (0.04640)  (0.02057)  (0.20035) 
ER(-4)  0.086470  0.012986  0.000298 -0.102993 
  (0.04425)  (0.03904)  (0.01731)  (0.16856) 
C  1.370959 -3.555259 -0.116531 -0.000308 
  (0.98572)  (0.86964)  (0.38562)  (3.75506) 
@TREND -0.001914  0.042810  0.003879  0.022981 
  (0.01471)  (0.01297)  (0.00575)  (0.05602) 
RGDP_ EA  0.159003  0.033647  0.066339 -0.508969 
  (0.09947)  (0.08775)  (0.03891)  (0.37892) 
INFL_EA -0.071873  0.824043 -0.109733 -0.912991 
  (0.26528)  (0.23405)  (0.10378)  (1.01059) 
IR_EA -0.256919  0.365698  0.162652 -0.333722 
  (0.17430)  (0.15378)  (0.06819)  (0.66399) 
 R-squared  0.961285  0.954902  0.994757  0.806274 
 Adj. R-squared  0.942400  0.932903  0.992199  0.711773 
 Sum sq. resids  23.11538  17.99185  3.537563  335.4493 
 S.E. equation  0.750859  0.662439  0.293738  2.860365 
 F-statistic  50.90160  43.40680  388.9489  8.531932 
 Log likelihood -57.38847 -49.62050  0.800396 -140.3126 
 Akaike AIC  2.528660  2.278081  0.651600  5.203633 
 Schwarz SC  3.249141  2.998562  1.372081  5.924114 
 Mean dependent  2.573764  2.917576  3.696613 -2.056605 
 S.D. dependent  3.128587  2.557381  3.325815  5.327876 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.100860   
 Determinant resid covariance  0.019288   
 Log likelihood -229.5004   
 Akaike information criterion  10.11292   
 Schwarz criterion  12.99484   
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Table A5: Forecast statistics for the estimated VAR 
Forecast:  ER_f INFL_f IR_f RGDP_f 
Forecast sample:  1998Q1 - 2013Q2 1998Q1 - 2013Q2 1998Q1 - 2013Q2 1998Q1 - 2013Q2 
Root Mean Squared Error:   2.326042  0.538694  0.238867  0.610597 
Mean Absolute Error:   1.926394  0.432844  0.183712  0.445483 
Mean Abs. Percent Error:   138.6233  43.22962  11.16407  25.79565 
Theil Inequality Coefficient:   0.214528  0.070010  0.024120  0.076164 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Note: RGDP is real GDP growth, INFL is inflation, IR denotes interest rate and ER is Exchange rate growth, 
_f denotes forecasted variables. 
 
 
Table A6: Comparison of calibrated covariance-variance ratios to Giavazzi and Missale 
Baseline Calibration Giavazzi a Missale (2004) 
Covariances entering the model Covariances - forecasting regression - TABLE 10 
Cov(yi)/Var(i) 0.0944 Cov(iπ)/Var(i) 0.9488 Cov(yi)/Var(i) -0.5360 Cov(iπ)/Var(i) -0.0160 
Cov(ye)/Var(e) -0.1140 Cov(eπ)/Var(e) -0.0062 Cov(ye)/Var(e) 0.0180 Cov(eπ)/Var(e) -0.0170 
Cov(yπ)/Var(π) -0.3108 Cov(eπ)/Var(π) -0.1149 Cov(yπ)/Var(π) -0.0420 Cov(eπ)/Var(π) -1.1700 
Var(i) 0.0006 Cov(ie)/Var(i) -1.4908 Var(i) 0.0120 Cov(ie)/Var(i) -2.1660 
Var(e) 0.0532 Cov(ie)/Var(e) -0.0157 Var(e) 0.8990 Cov(ie)/Var(e) -0.0270 
Var(π) 0.0029 Cov(iπ)/Var(π) 0.1866 Var(π) 0.0130 Cov(iπ)/Var(π) -0.0140 
Source: Author’s calculations and Giavazzi and Missale (2004) 
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Figures 
 
Figure A1: Plots of the estimated VAR residuals 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: RGDP is real GDP growth, INFL is inflation, IR denotes interest rate and ER is Exchange rate growth 
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Figure A2: One-step ahead forecast fits of the estimated VAR 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: RGDP is real GDP growth, INFL is inflation, IR denotes interest rate and ER is Exchange rate growth 
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Figure A3: Results of the sensitivity analysis 
  
  
  
  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table B1: Fiscal adjustment plans of the Czech government and estimates of their success 
Date Prime Minister Adjustment Plan 
Successful 
Yes/Partly/No 
2013 Jiří Rusnok 
The government shall keep the fiscal deficit below 3% of 
GDP to conclude the procedure of excessive deficit imposed 
on the Czech Republic by the European Commission.   
YES 
2010 Petr Nečas 
The government is determined, under the assumption of 
continued economic growth, to reach balanced budget (zero 
fiscal deficit) in 2016. A precondition for this goal is the aim 
to bring the fiscal deficit at or below 3% of GDP in 2013. 
YES 
2013 goal partly 
 2016 goal PARTLY 
YES 
2009 Jan Fischer 
The government is to undertake steps to reduce government 
expenditures in 2009 to ensure that the fiscal deficit will not 
exceed 5% of GDP based on the ESA 95 methodology. In 
parallel, the government’s goal is to propose government 
budget for 2010 with a deficit of less than CZK 170 billion, 
that is 5% of GDP. 
PARTLY  
2009 goal NO, 2010 
goal YES 
2007 
Mirek 
Topolánek II. 
The government is committed to reduce the fiscal deficit in 
upcoming years to the following levels: 3% of GDP in 2008, 
2.6% of GDP in 2009, and 2.3% of GDP in 2010.  
PARTLY  
2008 goal YES, 2009 
goal NO, 2010 goal 
NO 
2006 
Mirek 
Topolánek I. 
The government did not set for itself any parametric goal, it 
merely stated that: the government will aim to stabilize public 
finances and gradually reduce fiscal deficit to ensure that a 
balanced budget can be developed in the long term. 
PARTLY 
2007 deficit 
decreased compared 
to  2006 
2005 Jiří Paroubek 
The government commits to reaching a fiscal deficit 
significantly below 4% of GDP in 2006, and establishing a 
trend that shall ensure the deficit will not exceed 3% of GDP 
as of 2008.  
YES 
2004 Stanislav Gross 
The government shall continue reducing the fiscal deficit and 
bring it below 4% of GDP by 2006 and below 3% of GDP by 
2008. 
YES 
2002 Vladimír Špidla 
The government will commence a broad-based discussion 
about the reform of public finances to ensure that the fiscal 
deficit will stay in the range of 4.9-5.4% of GDP in 2006, and 
show a decreasing trend in the subsequent years. 
YES 
2006 goal YES, 
Declining Trend 
Deficit in 2007 YES 
Source: Authors based on Government of the Czech Republic web pages <http://www.vlada.cz/en/> and Eurostat 
data 
Note: Targeted and actual fiscal balances are not based on cyclically adjusted numbers, which could have been 
more appropriate as the current best practice suggests   
 
